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“Among Third-Wave democracies that included constitutional procedures in their transition, what 




Perhaps no document better symbolizes a nation-state than a written constitution. In particular, 
during the unstable period of transition between autocracy and democracy, the investment of political and 
cultural capital in creating an entirely new constitution reflects an expectation on the part of participants 
that constitutions can exercise independent and legitimate authority on citizens and government within its 
jurisdiction. Thus, as constitutions either prologue a period of democratic renewal (e.g South Africa, 
1994) or constrain later democratic institutions (e.g. Chile, 1989), they offer important contributions to 
democratic theory (Mallios). This mixed-methodology study will attempt to explain how these processes 
used during transitions affect the consolidation of democratic regimes later.  
This question is important because, since at least 1945, the political science community has tried 
to better understand the forces that lead to democratic consolidation, authoritarian breakdown, and regime 
transition. However, there is significant variation in the conditions and features of democratic transitions, 
and significant variation in democratic outcomes. As part of contributing to resolving this puzzle, this 
paper theorizes that the less influence the autocratic regime exerts on the transitional and transitional-
constitutional processes, the more democratic the post-transition political system. With better frameworks 
for these transitions, political scientists can better study democratic theory. Likewise, as international and 
civil society organizations work to promote accountability, improved insight into methods of 






 This research question examines the relationship between constitutional procedures in transition 
and democratic development. The primary thesis question is organized to assess how the timing of 
constitutional and amendment procedures during democratic transitions impacts democratization efforts 
later. For the purpose of this study, I have developed an original Dataset of Transitional-Constitutional 
Paradigms, which includes key dates in the democratic transition and constitutional development of 77 
transitions between 1970 and 2005. This research is focused on the Third Wave democracies for various 
reasons. The first and second waves saw an increase in 29 and 24 democracies respectively, while the 
third wave reflects an over 60-country increase (Diamond 2011). This variety is useful in analyzing a 
broad array of countries and types of transitions, especially considering this wave was broadly distributed 
across the world (see Picture A). Secondly, the transitions to democracy in the first and second waves 
were generally slow processes that culminated over decades, whereas discrete events like a revolution or 
pacted transition found more frequently in the third wave are easier to study (Alberti 1994). Thirdly, as a 
part-quantitative analysis, indexes of democratic quality used in the study must overlap with the 
transitions in question: FreedomHouse’s and IDEA’s indexes start in 1978 and 1975, respectively, and 
therefore include Third Wave transitions.  
 
Definitions of Democracy 
Picture A: Countries that Participated in the Third Wave (in Blue) 
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Political science has struggled for a consensus on the definition of ‘democracy’ and effective 
metrics for understanding ‘democratic consolidation.’ Starting with the former, the status of a particular 
democracy can be assessed in terms of either “electoral democracy” or “liberal democracy.” An electoral 
democratic analysis is limited to “the study of the regime,” focused on merely avoiding authoritarianism 
and preventing democratic decay (Cullel and O’Donnell 2004, 9). Here, the focus will largely be on the 
fact of relatively free, fair, and frequent elections. While popular, this approach ignores teleological 
criteria like minority rights or whistleblower protections important to the functioning of fully realized, 
liberal democracy. 
In contrast, an assessment of liberal democracy is based on political liberties, minority rights, and 
the larger political institutions beyond elections. Examples include everything from a citizen’s ability to 
run for office or unionize, and the relative independence of the judiciary. This analysis’ focus on rights 
and broader institutions provides a higher standard for a consolidated democracy, as more criteria require 
measurement than elections alone (Grassi 2011). Political scientists like Davide Grassi and O’Donnell are 
skeptical of this approach because criteria are “changeable and undefined” and because it biases 
democratic indexes towards more consolidated, fully realized western democracies (Grassi 2011, 3). 
Nevertheless, the NGO FreedomHouse annual index focuses on states’ human rights regimes and political 
freedoms, asking varied questions from “do adult citizens enjoy universal and equal suffrage?” to “do 
national political parties of various ideological persuasions address issues of specific concern to minority 
or other relevant groups?” (Freedom House 2019).   
These distinct definitions of democracy are reflected in definitions of democratic consolidation. If 
you partake in an electoral analysis, the threshold for a democracy consolidating will be much lower than 
if you partake in the latter type of analysis. However, in either case, the ultimate objective is 
understanding “the expectation of the regime's endurance.” There are two common approaches of 
democratic endurance:  
(1)  The “Only Game in Town” theory states that democracy is consolidated when alternative 
options (e.g. communist revolution, foreign invasion, military coup, etc.) cease to significantly 
threaten the democratic political system. The basis for this analysis is deductive, as it will 
account for the disposition of political actors before making a conclusion about democratic 
consolidation (Kammas and Sarantides).  
(2)  If two fair and free elections with peaceful transitions pass sequentially, the rate of democratic 
stability increases significantly. With this conception, democracy ‘consolidates’ upon the second 
election and peaceful transition of power. In contrast to (1), this method is inductive and relies 
on past observed relationships between the amount of elections and democratic stability 
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(Rivera). For this paper, I will distinguish between transitional and post-transitional periods by 
the date of two national electoral cycles after the point of transition.  
Constitutions, in different ways, mirror the electoral and liberal analyses of democracy. In terms 
of electoral democracy, constitutions regulate and organize the administration of government. The content 
will frequently feature rules about elections, for example by delineating suffrage or empowering a certain 
body to oversee elections. In structuring the functioning of democratic government, constitutions 
prescribe the institutions, and therefore the basis, of electoral democracy. For the liberal analysis, 217 
constitutions mention ‘rights,’ which - as in the United States’ Bill of Rights - details the positive rights of 
people within the state’s jurisdiction; relatedly, often constitutions delineate freedoms from the 
government, in terms of the limits on government’s legitimate authority.  
  
Pacted and Ruptured Democratic Transitions 
How does the process of transition away from the previous regime affect the durability of the new 
democratic system? This section will assess current definitions for transitional paradigms and its 
predictions in terms of democratic outcomes later.  
As mentioned earlier, the history of democratic transitions is generally divided into three separate 
waves: the slow growth of 
democracy in the 19th 
century up until WW2, the 
rise after WW2, and then 
in the 1970s an explosion 
of democratic government 
that lasted until the early 
2000s (Huntington 1991) 
(Picture B). The first two 
waves were relatively 
concentrated to Europe, 
whereas the latter wave 
started in Western Europe 
before expanding into 
Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia (Diamond 2011). Huntington defines a democratic wave, as “a group of 
transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and 
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that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite directions during that period of time” (Huntington 
1991).  
The field has largely settled on a theoretical process of democratization known as the ‘transition 
paradigm’ (Diamond et al. 2014). Guillermo O’Donnell, in the late 1970s, developed this template, which 
begins with “negotiation between the outgoing authoritarian regime and its democratic opposition” 
(Diamond et al. 2014). As the Third Wave expanded to more countries, more attention was given to the 
extent to which the transition paradigm can ‘travel’ across regions. Carothers argued “there was no 
regular sequence of stages that countries go through following the fall of an authoritarian regime” 
(Carothers 2002). Political science thus often uses O'Donnell's theoretical transition template, with an 
added level of flexibility to account for exceptions and non-linear democratic progress. 
Transitions between governments – whether democratic or autocratic – can generally be typified into 
two separate sets: pacted transitions where oppositional forces work with the existing regime and 
ruptured transitions where a revolution or coup d’état supplants the ruling government. Pacted transitions 
fit more easily in the traditional transition paradigm due to the more linear process of negotiation, and 
thus the paradigm often excludes ruptured transitions (Diamond et al. 2014). While both transition types 
necessarily involve at some level interplay between relevant groups, the main difference between the two 
types of transition lies in the ‘mechanism’ (Diamond et al. 2014). In pacted transitions, a formal process 
like a constitutional convention prologues the transition. In ruptured political transitions, often temporary 
political bodies are built to manage the transitional period (Diamond et al. 2014).  
The political science field largely favors pacted transitions for eventual democratic consolidation 
in lieu of ruptured transitions (Diamond 2012, 148). For the most part, pacted transitions better provide 
consistency and stability as the system transitions into a new regime type, while in the immediate term 
keeping experienced government bureaucrats in place. Nonetheless, a ruptured transition may still 
positively rate to democracy, as a slow transition by non-violent, gradualist forces can leave autocratic 
institutions unreformed and corrupt, allowing autocratic-aligned forces to reverse momentum towards 
democracy (Diamond et al. 2014). 
Pacted transitions represent political negotiations between, for our purposes, an authoritarian 
regime, and a democratic opposition. Although many contextual factors play a key role in motivating 
each party, the transition paradigm suggests moderates in the regime and opposition will make deals and 
create a “system of mutual security,” while at the same time side-lining their respective hard-liners 
(Diamond 2012, 139). For example, in South Africa, Nelson Mandela’s ANC and President de Klerk’s 
NP worked together to create a new constitution, largely removing African and Afrikaner nationalists 
from deliberations (Nwosu).  
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The transition paradigm makes two predictions about the factors that lead to pact-making. 
Following significant internal strife, a system may emerge where neither the opposition nor the regime 
has the power to completely overcome the other; secondly, if each side trusts each other sufficiently to 
know that, if the other comes to or maintains power, their vital interests will not be undermined. In a 
political stalemate and with relative trust in the other, each party’s moderates can find room to negotiate 
an eventual pact. Diamond theorizes that, in the making of a pact, “at least two types of contests proceed 
simultaneously”: the parties will fight for short-term “power and policy outcomes,” and long-term efforts 
“to define rules and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners and losers in the 
future” (Diamond 2014, 138). The literature considers various forms of negotiation as indicative of a pact, 
including negotiated settlements, peace deals, and constitutional reform. These processes can formalize a 
transition, making clear the duties and prerogatives of each party. However, as a general matter, a pacted 
transition does not necessitate an eventual democratic consolidation, given the lack of guarantee that the 
incoming regime is democratic. For example, in the case of Mozambique, the 1990 constitution did 
nothing more than formalize and institutionalize a partial democracy (Virtanen 2016). 
Unlike pacted transitions, ruptured transitions are typified by minimal negotiation between the 
regime and opposition prior to the transition. This transition type can proceed by various actors, including 
through public protest, a coup d’état, a putsch by a powerful faction, regime collapse, or a military 
invasion and civil war (Colon-Rios 2012). Ruptured transitions need not end in democracy; thus, the 
literature has struggled to understand and differentiate between types of ruptured transitions, as well as 
their relationship to democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. For example, numerous theories 
describe the relationship between revolutionary actors and democratic development, including Kelsen’s 
concept of a “legal revolution” and Colon-Rios’ preference for the concept of “constituent powers.” Hans 
Kelsen discussed a theoretical ‘legal revolution,’ a purposefully oxymoronic term to describe 
transformations in the constitutional regime that cannot be legally justified by the present order (Colon 
Rios 2012). Kelsen, arguing that the concept of revolution speaks only to the fact of constitutional 
change, would thus ignore which person or body affected the change. Colon-Rios instead prefers the use 
of ‘constituent power,’ a natural and “legally unlimited faculty [for people] to give themselves any 
constitution they want'' (Colon Rios 2012, 595). Regardless of the forces involved in a ruptured transition, 
political movements often refer to themselves as revolutions (Diamond et al. 2014). Due to the difficulty 
in defining revolution, designating any particular ruptured transition a ‘revolution’ is a famously difficult 
task in political science. Much of the literature has thus moved away from discussing revolutions in the 
context of democratic transitions, a development that has also biased democratic theory toward pacted 
transitions.  
Hotchner 10 
The literature has therefore focused on factors that lead ruptured transitions towards democratic 
reforms. In particular, a successful democratic revolution requires mass protests against the ruling regime, 
a development both essential for revolution and that can precede involvement from other non-democratic 
forces (Colon-Rios 2014). The more involvement from non-democratic actors, particularly if perpetrating 
violence, the more reduced the power of protestors (Virtanen 2016). Interestingly, even in ruptured 
transitions, the parties that exist following a regime’s overthrow must still jockey for influence and create 
either an explicit or tacit pact (O’Donnell and Wolfson 2000). The relative power and disposition of pro-
democracy groups in the ruptured, post-regime political environment, therefore, affects the eventual 
constitutional system (Bacon and Inoguchi 2003).  
Ruptured transitions feature greater instability and less uniformity within the transition paradigm 
than pacted transitions, as the prior autocratic regime with which it would have been necessary to 
negotiate to form a pact has already left power. Thus, where constitutional reform is featured in ruptured 
transitions, the process generally follows the initial transition.  
 
Constitutional Reform 
Like the timing of the transition itself, what are the specific constitutional measures and processes that 
support or impede later democratic consolidation? This section will look at the present literature on 
constitutions generally, and constitutions in democratic transitions specifically. Of the universe of 77 
democratic transitions accounted for in my Dataset of Transitional-Constitutional Paradigms, only 47 
countries developed a new constitution. For the purposes of this paper, constitutional reform encapsulates 
both constitutional processes and amendment processes.  
 Before discussing the third wave transitions specifically, the first question worth asking is why 
countries - autocratic, democratic, or other - choose to develop new constitutions at all? The process of 
writing “the basic rules of the political game” is an arduous task that requires the active involvement of 
societal stakeholders (Ginsburg, Huq 2016); more than mere legislation, the act of creating a constitution 
requires a “blending of passion, rationality, and interest” on the part of stakeholders (Elster, 2016). A new 
constitution attempts to “channel conflict through formal political institutions” by defining the roles of 
different parties, and providing methods of resolution between actors in government and society 
(Ginsburg, Huq 2016). For the political elite, the value of new constitutions thus lies in the opportunity to 
re-define the political environment to their advantage. Beyond delineating the boundaries of legitimate 
government, constitutions historically also serve a role in establishing the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship. The process of re-thinking the political environment within constitutional reform mean 
constitutions are more often developed when nation-states and society are ‘in transition’ (Sunstein, 2001).  
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 The majority of the 133 constitutions developed between 1965 and 2010 lack a relationship to a 
democratic transition; instead, roughly 100 constitutions were enacted in the context of a) autocratic 
government, or b) independence movements, which for myriad reasons often collapsed into dictatorship. 
In contrast to the orthodox view of constitutions as inherently democratic, constitutions are also 
frequently used to legitimize the authority of the political status quo. While simple explanations suggest 
autocracies resort to constitutions in order to feign democratic legitimacy, the prospect of stabilizing the 
political system by “complement[ing] pre-existing norms by outlining who qualifies as a member of the 
new autocratic coalition and align expectations and norms within the group” provides an independent 
impetus for undergoing constitutional processes (Ginsburg, Simpur 2014). In fact, of 20th century South 
American dictatorships, those that developed new constitutions lasted longer in power, along with, on 
average, offering better respect for private property and individual freedoms (Ginsburg, Simpur 2014). As 
such, in the course of this study that focuses specifically on democratic constitutions, it is worth 
emphasizing that constitutional reform does not inherently involve democratization. 
 As said at the start of this section, not all 77 third-wave democratic transitions featured 
constitutional processes. Why did certain states choose to develop constitutions when they did, and others 
not? The act of constitution-making is not a random event, but - due to the significant cultural and 
political capital required to complete a constitution - instead is deeply embedded in a state’s political 
history. Of the 24 transitions that did not feature a constitutional process, seven transitions simply 
featured a reinstatement of a previous democratic constitution (Argentina 1973, Argentina 1983, 
Bangladesh, Latvia, Pakistan, Uganda, and Uruguay). Furthermore, while 17 countries continued to use 
the same constitution as the autocratic, outgoing regime (AOR), there is significant variation in the 
political environments: a democratic constitution simply lacked proper enforcement (e.g. Peru), the 
authoritarian constitution was amended sufficiently to allow democracy (e.g. South Korea), or simply the 
new democracy fell apart before a sustained constitutional process could reach completion (e.g. Sierra 
Leone 1996). This suggests that, in the case of authoritarian or reinstated-democratic constitutions, the 
post-transition regime might prefer to enforce existing/reinstated law (often with amendments) in lieu of 
jeopardizing the traditional authority and status quo with an unpredictable new process.  
 Furthermore, there is a growing literature aiming to catalogue and understand variations in the 
procedures and procedural facts of each constitutional process, as well as to theorize normative 
frameworks. Elster (2012) lists institutional variables that any constitutional process must consider: 
1. the mode of election or selection of delegates  
2. the qualifications (age, gender, income, literacy, etc.) of electors  
3. the qualifications of delegates  
4. the number of delegates 
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5. the seating of the delegates in the assembly  
6. secrecy or publicity of debates and votes during and after the tenure of the assembly  
7. allocation of time to speakers in the assembly 
8. allowing or forbidding deputies to read from written speeches 
9. the task of the assembly (constituent only or constituent and legislative)  
10. the location of the assembly 
11. the (minimal or maximal) duration of the assembly 
12. the (minimal or maximal) length of the constitutional text 
13. the procedures of ratification of the constitution 
14. the date of promulgation of the constitution 
The political science community has undertaken significant empirical research to understand 
patterns in Elster’s institutional variables. For instance, as a method of ratification, “public ratification 
has been on the rise since the turn of the twentieth century,” along with public mechanisms that reach 
earlier in the constitution’s development, such as in public election of delegates, citizen initiatives, or 
direct consultation (Blount et al, 39). In turn, public participation, at least in democracies, correlates with 
less political violence, longer constitutional endurance, and greater rights (Blount et al, 52). In terms of 
institutional variable (11), a random sample of 148 constitutions found the mean process took 1.32 years 
with a standard deviation of 1.84, with anecdotal evidence that “either a very short or very long amount of 
time [seems] to occur in non-democracies” (Blount et al, 40). The size of the deliberative body also 
appears to affect outcomes, as Kenya’s bloated 2007 process (over 600 delegates and two separate 
drafting committees) sacrificed “textual coherence and internal consistency” (Blount et al, 40).  
In these institutional variables lies significant variation in their operation, insofar as they 
empower different groups or permit public participation at different stages in the process. Widner 
identifies five phases in constitutional processes in “drafting, consultation, deliberation, adoption, and 
ratification” (Blount et al, 34), while Banting and Simeone start even earlier with the “mobilization of 
interests (and counter-interests) prior to the preparation of the text” (Blount et al, 35). Even more broadly, 
Elster distinguishes procedures as placing either “upstream” or “downstream” constraints on the 
constitutional process. Upstream-participants harbor influence in that they structure the constitution-
drafting body, but may nevertheless be constrained by the “preferences and needs of later-stage” 
participants to assure ratification (Blount et al, 35). Participants in the constitutional process at times 
feature ‘actors’ that are “veto players”; as such, this research will distinguish between the two by 
‘participants’ (or groups) with ‘actors’ who exert disproportionate control over the constitution’s 
development (Blount et al, 36).  
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The level of transparency and public oversight on the design process is also theorized to affect 
constitutional outcomes in different ways. For instance, Mueller (2000) argues greater visibility of the 
constitutional body may “reduce rent seeking and self-interest” as special interest groups are less able to 
peddle influence anonymously (Blount et al, 58); however, appeals to the public may lead to 
grandstanding as “political leaders seek to mobilize their supporters'' (Blout et al, 58). As such, Stasavage 
(2007) provides a “game-theoretic justification for limiting transparency” in order to avoid mass 
polarization from open deliberation (Blount et al, 58). Elster attempts to deal with the contradictions 
between Mueller’s and Stasavage’s hypotheses through the “hourglass” metaphor whereby public 
participation is most optimal “via public hearings at the upstream stage and some form of ratification at 
the downstream stage” that bookend the mid-stream “writing and deliberation” that requires secrecy in 
order for participants and actors to adequately negotiate and bargain.  
The field thus is trying to contend with a complex array of forces and relationships in time. This 
analysis seeks to contribute to the new and growing literature trying to understand the force of 
constitutions in the context of democratic transitions. However, rather than focusing on the relationship 
between specific constitutional processes and textual content (Blount et al. 43), this analysis connects the 
larger power dynamics reflected in the constitutional process directly to democratic outcomes. While the 
specific constitutional policies and procedures provide a useful qualitative tool for understanding regime 
influence in transitions, the timing of transitional and constitutional reform may provide a stronger 
vehicle for understanding how constitutional reform plays out within the wider political environment to 
support or hinder democratic consolidation later. As will be made clearer, this analysis does not address 
the content of the processes in particular; rather, my focus is on the arrangement of the constitutional and 
transitional processes in relation to each other1. This thesis is therefore making a theoretical and empirical 
contribution to the comparative study of constitutional and democratic theory.  
 
Theory and Hypothesis 
 
Transitional and Constitutional Processes 
 
Despite scholarship that supports a correlation between different variables and democratic quality, there 
remains significant variation in democratic outcomes across countries. The goal of this analysis, therefore, 
is to examine how the transitional paradigm a particular country uses during the democratic transition 
 
1 An important assumption implicit in my work is that a new constitutional process is motivated by a perception that 
the current constitutional setup is inadequate. 
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impacts the resulting consolidation, structure, and quality of that democracy. In this section, I will provide 
my theoretical argument and operationalize my two hypotheses for statistical analysis and process tracing.  
 The theoretical argument focuses on the interaction between the Autocratic, Outgoing Regime 
(AOR) and the post-transition, democratic opposition then new regime during transitional constitutional 
and amendment processes (Albertus and Menaldo 577). Even if committed to a ‘democratic outcome,’ the 
outgoing, autocratic regime will have certain interests in the post-transition political environment. This 
may include an institutional base of support and mechanisms to maintain political power, or impunity for 
human rights atrocities and/or weakened transitional justice processes. In contrast, to the extent the 
opposition is united and/or democratic, the new regime has certain interests in weakening the prior 
autocracy’s political legitimacy and developing its own, frequently by establishing institutions that reflect 
their relative popular support.  
As such, constitutional and amendment processes do not exist in a vacuum, but are a response to 
perceived lessons of history, with a relationship between the current and hypothetical, imagined, and post-
transition political environment. The more an actor exerts power at different points of the constitutional 
and amendment process, the more influence that power has in the eventual formation of the document 
and, thus, securing their interests in that post-transition political environment. Importantly, there is a large 
degree of asymmetry between the autocratic regime and democratic opposition’s ability to affect these 
interests at different points in the process.  
To borrow Elster’s ‘upstream and downstream’ dichotomy, procedures employed in upstream 
stages are important in defining the rules and political power in constitutional assemblies, while 
downstream ratification methods place theoretical constraints on the constitutional assembly. This paper 
theorizes that the decision not to adopt constitutional and even amendment processes is sourced in the 
same upstream political context. As such, the longer the autocratic regime is in power during the 
constitutional timeline, the more likely its interests are reflected in the post-transition political 
environment; inversely, the less the autocratic regime exerts control over the timeline, the more likely the 
new democratic regime’s interests are reflected in the post-transition political environment. 
Influence of the Pre-Transition Regime in Constitutional and Amendment Process 
The particular interests of the AOR depend on their actions while in power and their interest in power 
post-transition. Weeks (2003) offers a useful division, for example, of traditional military interests in 
Chile: 
● Institutional Role: Institutional integrity; constitutional role.  
● Defense and Security Policy: Formulation of military doctrine; strategic goals and threat 
scenarios; maintaining internal and social order; combating external invasion; combating internal 
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subversion; equipment and armaments; relations with foreign militaries; foreign policy relating to 
military issues. 
● Internal Administration: Salaries; recruitment; disciplinary autonomy; education; promotion for 
junior officers; promotion for senior officers; duty assignments. 
● Domestic Policy: Election monitoring; disaster relief; building infrastructure; health and 
sanitation assistance; education assistance; immigration; technical innovation and research; 
armaments and related public enterprises. 
● Socio-Political Issues: Racial, ethnic, and tribal divisions; religious beliefs; political affiliation of 
officers. 
While intended to be as “complete as possible,” the salience of each interest depends on the military’s 
history, path to power, and current political environment (Weeks 15). An autocratic government that 
participated in human rights atrocities might place roadblocks and/or demand significantly more 
compromises from the democratic opposition (e.g. Argentina 1983); in contrast, transitional governments 
that followed either coup (e.g. Turkey 1982) or public mass mobilization (e.g. Tunisia 2010) might have 
less demands from the process and product. Furthermore, in some way all these interests intersect deeply 
with the letter and the spirit of constitutional law, such that constitutional and amendment procedures are 
highly salient for all politically involved parties. 
 
Theory: The less influence the pre-transition autocratic regime has on the constitutional process, the 
more consolidated the democracy will be later.  
 
Table 1: Universe of Democratic Transitions (1975-2005) 
Hypothesis #1: Constitutional 
Processes (N=47/77) 
Hypothesis #2: Amendment 
Processes (N = 62/79) 
Albania - 1991 
Bangladesh - 1973 
Belarus - 1994 
Benin - 1991 
Brazil - 1989 
Bulgaria - 1990 
Burkina Faso - 1978 
Burundi - 2005 
Cape Verde - 1991 
CAR - 1981 
CAR - 1993 
Dominican Republic - 1996 
Ecuador - 1979 
Argentina - 1973 
Argentina - 1983 
Armenia - 1998 
Bangladesh - 1973 
Bangladesh - 1991 
Belarus - 1994 
Benin - 1991 
Bolivia - 1985 
Brazil - 1989 
Bulgaria - 1990 
Burundi - 2005 
Cape Verde - 1991 
CAR - 1981 
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Ecuador - 2002 
El Salvador - 1984 
Estonia - 1992 
Georgia - 1992 
Ghana - 1992 
Greece - 1974 
Honduras 1981 
Kenya - 2002 
Lesotho - 1993 
Macedonia - 1991 
Madagascar - 1992 
Malawi - 1994 
Mali - 1992 
Moldova - 1994 
Mongolia - 1998 
Namibia - 1990 
Nepal - 1991 
Nicaragua - 1984 
Niger - 1993 
Niger - 1999 
Nigeria - 1979 
Nigeria - 1999 
Pakistan - 1970 
Paraguay - 1989 
Peru - 1980 
The Philippines - 1986 
Poland - 1990 
Portugal - 1976 
Romania - 1990 
Russia - 1991 
Senegal - 2000 
Slovakia - 1990 
South Africa - 1994 
Spain - 1977 
Sri Lanka - 1977 
Thailand - 1975 
Thailand - 1992 
Turkey - 1983 
Ukraine - 1991 
Zambia - 1991 
Chile -1989 
Croatia - 2000 
Cyprus - 1981 
Dominican Republic - 1978 
Dominican Republic - 1996 
Ecuador - 1979 
El Salvador - 1984 
Estonia - 1992 
Georgia - 2004 
Ghana - 1992 
Greece - 1974 
Guatemala - 1995 
Guinea-Bissau - 2005 
Honduras 1981 
Hungary - 1990 
Indonesia - 1999 
Latvia - 1993 
Lesotho - 1993 
Lithuania - 1993 
Madagascar - 1992 
Malawi - 1994 
Mali - 1992 
Mexico - 2000 
Moldova - 1994 
Namibia - 1990 
Nepal - 1991 
Niger - 1993 
Niger - 1999 
Nigeria - 1979 
Nigeria - 1999 
Pakistan - 1988 
Panama - 1989 
Peru - 1980 
Peru - 2001 
The Philippines - 1986 
Poland - 1990 
Portugal - 1976 
Russia - 1991 
Sierra Leone - 2002 
South Africa - 1994 
South Korea - 1988 
Spain - 1977 
Taiwan - 1992 
Thailand - 1975 
Thailand - 1992 
Turkey - 1983 
Uganda - 1980 
Uruguay - 1984 
Zambia - 1991 
Hotchner 17 
 
Hypothesis #1: If a new constitution is 
started and completed after the election of 
the new democratic regime (Type III), the 
resulting democracy will be more 
consolidated than countries that started and 
completed a new constitution prior to the 
democratic transition (Type I), and started a 
new constitution prior to the democratic 
transition and finished it after (Type II). 
 
In Model 1, we see the conceptual 
differences in regime overlap over the 
timeline of the constitutional process. Type III represents the hypothesis, with Type I and Type II 
representing the alternate hypotheses2.  
 
The autocratic, outgoing regime (AOR) can influence the constitution and amendment process differently 
at different phases (which may still overlap): 
1. Mobilization of Interests: This is defined as ‘the “idea-generating stage” at which large 
parameters are laid out and the process itself may be determined’ (Blount et al). This process may 
be informal and done without public input (e.g. Chile 1980), formalized into an electoral process 
for a constituent assembly (e.g. Chile 2021), or some variation thereof. The extent to which the 
AOR controls initial constitutional decisions - including the number and mode of election of 
delegates, the task of the assembly, the location of the assembly, and the procedural rules - the 
more institutional control that AOR exerts in downstream process (Blount et al 34). Decisions 
made here might be hard to change, as there is “a fair degree of inertia in the later stages of the 
process” (Blount et al 39). 
2. Drafting: The writing of the constitution, conditioned by the procedural rules and distribution of 
power adopted following phase (1). The more AOR-affiliated or dependent the constituent body 
is on the AOR (whether a majority, or merely enough representation to veto proposals the AOR 
dislikes), the more likely the product reflects their interests.  
 
2 Type 4 and Type 5 Transition do not feature new constitutions, and are therefore addressed in Hypothesis #2.  
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3. Consultation: This ideally comprises “information provided to the deliberative process by people 
who mirror the population as a whole,” but can include the “‘interested public’ (civil society 
organizations, political parties) and ordinary citizens” (Widner). The AOR may try to limit public 
access (and if not, mobilize its interests publicly) to the consultative process and leverage formal 
networks to influence constitutional proceedings. As the process unfolds, the relative power that 
the autocratic regime has can affect the constitutional body’s work in less tangible ways, 
including abuse of police and spying powers, influencing public information, and lobbying for 
certain constitutional provisions (Albertus and Menaldo 166).  
4. Deliberation: This covers final “deliberations” about the draft before adoption and ratification.  
5. Adoption: The adoption of a final draft. Whether the constituent assembly adopts the final 
document, or if a secondary body or set of bodies exercise a de facto veto on proposed drafts, 
these institutional mechanisms will deter or allow AOR influence on the constitutional outcome.  
6. Ratification: The ratification of the final draft. Depending on the political dynamics at play, 
certain methods of ratification might be more or less likely to ratify the constitutional draft.  
As an additional note, downstream processes (4),(5), and (6) that follow the constitutional drafting might 
constrain or prod the constitutional body toward certain reforms; for instance, a popular referendum might 
push a constitutional body to comport its product to the people’s demands (relative to the threshold for 
ratification), while ratification by the constitutional assembly or legislative body will lead to different sets 
of incentives during the writing process. 
In general, autocratic interests are not particularly invested in democratic institution-building 
(Albertus and Menaldo 166). The more the autocratic regime’s power predominates during key 
constitutional decisions, the more likely their interests will align with decision-making. If the autocratic 
regime is no longer in power, the ability to manipulate constitutional decision-making is constrained by 
the extent to which vestiges of the AOR exist that can influence the process.  
In contrast, democratic opposition to the regime’s influence in constitutional matters depends 
greatly on whether they are in power or not. Prior to transitions, opposition parties might lack sufficient 
resources and organizational infrastructure, yet are still victim to influence by the autocratic regime’s use 
of political authority (Howard and Roessler 371); post-transition, the democratic opposition is likely in 
power, such that these concerns are less salient. In upstream stages, a democratic opposition must agree to 
a new constitutional procedure with a more powerful autocratic regime, while a post-transition democratic 
regime has a lot more freedom to structure the constitutional process to their preference. In midstream 
stages, while a democratic opposition and democratic regime might both privately lobby and publicly 
mobilize democratic support during the writing process, those activities will be more successful when not 
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in the opposition. Lastly, downstream processes are less susceptible to voter or legislative intimidation 
after transitions than when the prior, autocratic regime is in power3.  
As such, the relative power of the autocratic regime and post-transition democratic regime during 
the constitutional process defines the final constitution and thus the post-transition political environment. 
This ‘relative power’ is coded in terms of the autocratic regime’s overlap with the constitutional process, 
measured as a fraction of the time that the AOR was in power during the constitutional process.  
Hypothesis #2: In transitions that feature no new constitutional processes or regime-affected 
constitutional processes, the post-transition regimes that amend those constitutions more will be more 
democratically consolidated later.   
 
Like the theory underlying 
Hypothesis 1, the more the 
constitution remains 
unchanged from the 
previous autocracy, the less 
likely institutions have been 
reformed sufficiently to 
sustain democratization efforts. This is particularly true in regard to the different types of transitional-
constitutional timelines. For example, Type IV transitions might simply be the authoritarian constitution, 
Type I constitutions might be heavily developed by the AOR consenting to at least some transition, and 
Type II constitutions affected by the AOR regime most asymmetrically upstream.  
 The amendment process, like the constitutional process, changes the operation of the state, and 
generally requires a higher threshold for agreement and longer debate (Yegen). To extend the prior-
mentioned autocratic and democratic interests from Hypothesis 1, the prior regime might prefer the 
constitution at transition to any post-transition reforms the democratic regime wants to implement. 
Inversely, the democratic regime might prefer to make significant changes, especially depending on how 
authoritarian the constitution. As such, the more amendments to the constitution passed during the 
transitional window, the more democratic the institutions that sustain democracy later. 
As mentioned, the “transitional window” is composed of two electoral terms. Type III transitions, 
since they are unlikely to undergo significant changes to a brand-new constitution, are left out of the new 
universe of cases (N = 60/80). The number of amendments ratified during the transitional window is 
based on HeinOnline’s database of amendment years (1 = year with an amendment process, 0 = years 
 
3 Let alone the matter of which downstream method best pressures upstream actors to adopt democratic measures. 
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where there was not an amendment process). The existence of a constitutional process (New_Cons = 1/0) 
will be used as an additional control variable in Hypothesis #2 statistical analysis.  
This analysis therefore hypothesizes regime influence on constitutional reform and amendment 
processes during the transitional timeline will negatively impact outcomes in democratic quality later. 
However, there are many alternative explanations for why democracies transition, and then consolidate or 
break down.   
Methodology 
This analysis offers a method for understanding how AOR influence and impact constitutional 
and amendment processes during democratic transitions. In order to fully explicate my causal mechanism, 
I used a mixed methodology research design that both employs quantitative and then qualitative methods.  
 By this section, I have introduced the current literature on democratic consolidation and 
constitutional reform, in addition to my theoretical framework, which seeks to describe AORs' influence 
in constitutional and amendment processes4. Following this section, I will further introduce my 
independent, control, and dependent variables for qualitative and quantitative analysis. This will prepare 
the reader for the presentation and discussion of the quantitative results, which are divided into 
constitutional and amendment processes (Hypothesis #1 and #2, respectively). This initial discussion will 
prologue and frame the process tracing of case studies of transitions in Chile, Nigeria, and the Philippines; 
this analysis draws on a combination of constituent assembly, government reports, and secondary 
accounts and analyses5. Finally, I conclude with the findings’ implications for the field of democratic and 
constitutional theory, as well as offer a few suggestions for future research.  
Independent, Control and Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables: Regime Influence on Transitional-Constitutional Processes 
AOR Influence on 
Constitutional Process 
(RICP) 
RICP, as a quantitative measure, is on an ordinal scale, where x<0 = the AOR 
was not in power during any of the constitutional process and x>1 = AOR was 
in power during the entire constitutional process.6 If between 0 and 1, the 
variable represents the time that the autocratic regime overlapped with the 
constitutional process. Importantly, the variable can be coded as less than 0 or 
more than 1, given the proportion of the constitutional process’ length before 
 
4 Defined as procedures that did lead to a new constitution or new amendment.  
5 The databases used for quantitative data are summarized in the Variables section and further in the Appendix.   
6 RICP is illustrated and discussed further in Figure 1 of the Theory & Hypothesis section. The raw formula and 
calculations for RICP are in Appendix A. 
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or after the transition date. This variable is calculated from data compilated in 
the Dataset of Transitional-Constitutional Paradigms.  
 
The qualitative analysis combines two theoretical constitutional timelines 
broken into six parts: pre-process “mobilization of interests,” drafting, 
consultation, deliberation, adoption, and ratification (Widener; Banting and 
Simeone). The AOR’s role in the constitutional process will be assessed 
qualitatively in terms of a) whether its influence and interests were represented 
in each step, and the b) resulting impact on post-transition civic-military 
relations.[National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA); 




As a quantitative measure, Total_Amend counts the number of years that 
feature an amendment process between the transition and two electoral cycles 
(assuming elections would have continued). The impact of post-transition 
amendments will be further clarified with case studies of amendment 
processes, and their effect on civil-military relations. [Chronology of 
Constitutional Events v. 1.3 (CCP)] 
 
Control Variables 
Prior Liberalization The view that certain cultures are more adept at democracy is taken account of 
with the Democracy_1920 variable; this data counts the number of years of 
previous democratic governments from 1920 to the date of transition (+6-10 in 
Polity5_Dem Scale). [Polity IV: Polity5 Polity-Case Format] 
Gini Coefficient To account for the view that more equal economies lead to more democratic 
political outcomes, this data uses an average of the Gini Coefficient from 
1970-2019. [World Bank] 
GDP per Capita To account for the view that richer economies lead to more democratic 
political outcomes, this data uses an average of the GDP per capita from 
1970-2019. [World Bank] 
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PPI To account for the view that stronger parliamentary bodies vis-à-vis the 
executive branch lead to more democratic political outcomes, this data uses 
the 2007 Parliamentary Power Index (PPI) scores for each country (Fish and 
Kroenig), 
Literacy Rate To account for the view that higher rates of education leads to more 
democratic political outcomes, this data uses an average of the Literacy Rate 
from 1970-2019. [World Bank] 
Regime Inclusion of 
Ethnic Diversity 
To account for the view that ethnic divisions leads to lower rates of 
democratic political outcomes, this data uses an average of the polleq score for 
Regime/Government Inclusion from 1995-2019. [Polity IV: State Fragility 
Index and Matrix] 
Natural Resource To account for the view that dependence on natural resources leads to lower 
rates of democratic political outcomes. This data uses an average of natural 
resource rents (%) from 1970-2019. 
 
Dependent Variables: The Non-Recurrence of Autocracy 
Democratic 
Consolidation 
DV-1 will be measured quantitatively in terms of democratic quality indicators 
from IDEA - C_A1: Representative Government, C_A2: Fundamental Rights, 
C_A3: Checks on Government, and C_A4: Impartial Administration. C_A1 
tests electoral democracy, while C_A2, C_A3, and C_A4 involve different 
aspects of a liberal analysis. Democratic quality will be measured qualitatively 
in terms of the extent to which the post-transition constitution reforms key 




Hypothesis #1: Constitutional Processes – Results 
 
The first hypothesis addresses the impact of constitutional processes - specifically AOR influence on 
these processes – on resulting 
democratic outcomes. RICP, in 
Graph 1, is skewed toward 
AOR-controlled constitutional 
processes. The median is 0.989 
and the mean is 0.823, further 
indicating that transitions more 
often feature Type I and Type II 
transitional-constitutional 
paradigms. Table 1 below 
features the statistical results for 
an OLS regression of the 
predictors and each particular 
dependent variable. A step-wise regression was used prior to the OLS to refine the model and remove 
insignificant control variables; in addition, an ANOVA test indicated significant in-group variability 
between RICP Types in C_A1, leading that particular model to include the square value of the RICP.  
Table 1: OLS for Hypothesis 1 
























































The OLS model provides a picture for understanding which predictors contribute to the particular 
outcome variables. In each dependent variable, economic data in GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient 
are each significant; PPI contributes to C_A1: Representative Government and C_A3: Checks on 
Government. The RICP and RICP-squared 
values, in C_A1, are significant and contribute 
to the outcome variable. As the former’s 
coefficient is positive and the latter’s is 
negative, C_A1 improves with more RICP 
until that value exceeds a certain threshold. 
This pattern is repeated in the following Graph 
2, which includes a squared-RICP curve to 
better illustrate the relationship between the 
RICP Types (I = Black, II = Red, and III = 
Green) and the democratic outcome in 
question.  
 
The strong correlation in C_A1 stands in 
contrast to the rest of the outcome variables, which did not display statistically significant difference 
between means to justify a quadratic. Additional descriptive analysis may help to explain the relationship 
between RICP in C_A1 and the other dependent variables. The relationship between RICP Types and the 
Dependent Variables (in binary form, where y<0.5 = 0 & y>0.5 = 1), is examined here: 
 
Natural Resources -0.0121** 
(0.0244) 












Cross Table C_A1: Representative Government provides further support for the statistical results. Type I 
(RICP > 1) and Type III transitions (RICP < 0) are worse for achieving a positive outcome than Type II 
transitions, which features both less and more regime influence than the Type I and Type III transitions, 
respectively. In fact, Type II transitions – which include periods of both AOR and democratic influence – 
are the most likely to have a representative government after two electoral cycles, at 85.7%. As 
mentioned, only C_A1’s model justified specifying the RICP as a squared-value. Nevertheless, even as 
the in-group variation in mean did not justify such a specification in the others, the descriptive results 
Cross Tables for C_A2: Fundamental Rights, C_A3: Checks on Government, and C_A4: Impartial 
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Administration a) resemble C_A1 improved outcomes in Type II transitions relative to Type I and Type 
III transitions. As such, while there is statistically significant support for RICP causally contributing to 
C_A1 and Electoral Democracy, the relationship between RICP and measures of liberal democracy 
(C_A2, C_A3, and C_A4) are just descriptively correlative and thus weaker.    
These results, in general, make sense across the outcome variables for various reasons. Firstly, 
similar control variables were determined to be significant across the various outcomes. Secondly, given 
the correlation between democratic outcomes, doing well in C_A1 will have a relationship with the other 
respective outcomes. Thirdly, this fits into the scholarship’s preference for pact-making (in this case, via 
constitutional reform) in the transition process (Diamond). Thus, Type I transitions suffer from too much 
influence from the AOR in the constitutional process, while Type III transitions suffer from too little. In 
the middle, Type II transitions benefit from a moderate level of RICP influence in the constitutional-
transitional process.   
Hypothesis #2: Amendment Processes 
The second hypothesis addresses the use of amendments to dispel residual AOR influence on post-
transition institutions and politics. Graph 3 demonstrates that 20 transitions do not include any new 
amendments, 11 transitions feature a single amendment and eight transitions feature two; furthermore, the 




Nevertheless, the use of amendment processes during transitions is not uniform across all transition types, 
as is shown in Cross Table below. Transitions that feature constitutions are less likely to engage in 
amendment processes, with 70.3% (26) of transitions featuring 1 or less amendments. In contrast, 
transitions that do not feature new constitutions are more likely to engage in amendment processes; for 
that class of transitions, only 56.5% (13) featured an amendment or less. Transitions without a new 
constitution were more likely, in turn, to feature two or more amendment years, with 43.5% (10) against 
the 29.7% (11) that did use a new constitution. This likely arises from post-transition deciding to reform 
the system through either a constitutional or amendment process, which in turn decreases the necessity of 
using the other mechanism.  
The pair of cross-tabulations, 
like in Hypothesis 1, suggests 
a positive correlation between 
the number of amendments 
and successful democratic 
outcomes. Transitions that 
feature zero constitutional amendments are less likely to be coded 1 for C_A1 or C_A2 than transitions 
that feature two or more constitutional amendments. The question remains whether the relationship is 




Below is Table 2, which illustrates the statistical results from Hypothesis 2. As mentioned previously, 
whether the transition featured a new constitution or not is coded here as a control variable.  
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The results from the OLS regression does not support the hypothesis that the number of amendment years 
is a contributing factor in whether, after two electoral terms, the post-transition government is 
democratically representative (C_A1), respects fundamental human rights (C_A2), is checked by other 
institutions and actors (C_A3), and administrates government impartially (C_A4). Instead, the OLS 
regression again finds economic factors in Gini coefficient and GDP per capita to be significant, along 
with the PPI score and rate of Regime Inclusion. This indicates that the aforementioned pattern described 
in Cross Tab 4 and Cross Tab 5 is incidental. The lack of clarity in regard to Hypothesis 2 likely indicates 
that the different transition types as modelled are not easily compared, as the different constitutional and 
democratic histories involved produce different incentives toward amendment procedures. For example, 
both Type IV and Type V transitions lacked a newly developed constitution; however, Type IV transition 
types keep the authoritarian constitution and Type V transitions reinstate a democratic constitution. The 
rational for an amendment process is entirely different in each case, with the former likely requiring more 
reform than the latter.   
Table 2: OLS for Hypothesis 2 


































    






































Case Study Introduction 
From the quantitative analysis, we find statistically significant support for the view that autocratic control 
according to Type II transition types supports better electoral democratic outcomes after two terms than 
Type I and Type III transition types. This likely suggests that the optimal transition-constitutional 
paradigm for achieving electoral democracy is one with as much influence from the democratic 
opposition as possible within a stable, pacted, AOR-supported transition. At the same time, the level of 
regime influence in constitutional reform is not a determinative in measures for liberal democracy. In 
regard to Hypothesis 2, there is not statistically significant evidence to support or dismiss the impact of 
amendment reform on democratic outcomes.  
The case studies, in turn, will use process-tracing to cross-check the extent of the quantitative 
findings in democratic consolidation later. A successful democratic outcome will hinge on whether, 
following two electoral cycles, democracy is “the only game in town.” As mentioned previously, this is a 
framework for measuring electoral democracy, given that the relevance of the electoral process to 
policymaking is a precondition for effective democracy. This mode of analysis is suitable for answering 
the question, given that acceptance of the democratic process by the outgoing, autocratic regime and other 
actors means the country has satisfied a minimal threshold for electoral democracy. For the case studies, I 
chose to qualitatively examine Chile’s 1989 transition, the Philippines’ 1987 transition, and Nigeria’s 
1999 transition for several reasons. In each case, the primary threat to democratic consolidation lay in the 
military’s formal or informal intervention in civilian politics, such that its involvement in politics 
constitutes a comparable qualitative unit of analysis7. The selected transitions, which took place at 
different points and regions, reflects the diversity of democratic transitions within the Third Wave. Lastly, 
the level of regime influence in constitutional reform is different in each case study: Chile’s transitional 
autocratic constitution typifies a transitional-constitutional process in which the military junta exerts total 
control of constitutional reform; Nigeria’s autocratic-developed constitution in contrast featured particular 
democratic influences; the Philippines’ post-transition civilian government exercised a significant degree 
of influence in constitutional reform. As such, a comparison of the case studies will help test the 
dependent variable of whether the autocratic interests/military still threatens democracy. 
 Croissant and Kuehn define civilian control of civil-military relations as “a particular state in the 
relations between the civilian political authorities and military leadership in which the civilians alone 
 
7 To a certain extent, this minimizes the generalizability of my case study results, given that many transitions did not 
feature particular military threats to politics (e.g. Eastern Europe, whose dictatorships were based on single-party 
rule).  
Hotchner 30 
have the power to decide on national policies” (189). This definition is divided into three decision-making 
areas, including “elite recruitment and overall public policy, national defense, and internal security” 
(Croissant and Keuhn 190).  This analysis will adopt this standard of “military involvement in politics,” 




The military junta (the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Carabineros) came to power following the overthrow 
of Chilean Socialist President Salvador Allende on September 11th, 1973. After being the last major 
general to sign onto the coup plot, Head of the Army Augusto Pinochet “moved methodically to 
distinguish himself from the rest of the Junta,” becoming President of the Republic by December 18th, 
1974 (Kornbluh 163). Following the coup, the military junta “consolidated and institutionalized its 
repressive rule,” quickly banning political parties, closing Congress, establishing secret police, and 
shutting down unallied media outlets (Kornbluh 162). The brutal regime lasted until 1990, nearly 
seventeen years after the initial coup d’etat. 
 
The 1980 Constitution  
The 1980 Constitution, after seven years of “rule by exception” or emergency powers, became an 
important aspect of the autocratic, military regime led by Pinochet8, who exerted complete control over 
the process from 1973 to 1980.  
“Mobilization 
of Interests” 
The impetus for reform to the 1925 Constitution grew out of numerous internal and 
external pressures. By 1977, Pinochet and the Junta internally recognized the need to 
establish the autocracy on firm legal ground, following an extended period of rule by 
emergency powers; at the time, a small group of conservative jurists were already 
working “leisurely” on a draft (Collier and Sater), given the Junta believed that “that 
such a document would force them to define an end to the regime and to specify 
prematurely the outlines of a new political order” (Valenzuela).  Following 
“international pressure to form a more legitimate aspect for his rule,” and the purging 
of Air Force Chief Leigh from the Junta in mid-1978, Pinochet could more 
comfortably create a “constitutional order that would ratify the new power relations” 
(O’Malley; Valenzuela). The broad outlines of that constitutional order were pre-
 
8 While the constitution was developed and ratified prior to the transition period used for quantitative analysis, the 
constitution included “transitional dispositions” and clauses that kept Pinochet in power until at least 1989.  
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established in 1977, when Pinochet announced a “protected democracy and specific 
timeline for return to civilian rule” (Valenzuela).  
Drafting The Comisión de Estudio de la Nueva Constitución de la República - or la Comisión 
Ortúzar - was appointed by the military government and “consisted of seven men and 
one woman” (Schreiber and Zilla). The commission met 417 times between 1973 and 
1978 to “produce the general framework for the restructuring of Chilean politics” 
(Weeks). From August-September of 1978, this framework was converted into 
specific constitutional articles, which from then until July 1980 were “argued, 
changed, and sometimes changed back” (Weeks). The commissioners were all civilian 
lawyers connected to the Pinochet regime.  
Consultation The work of the commission depended directly on the direction and internal politics of 
the military junta. The meeting transcripts are littered with “references to what 
Pinochet had said privately about a given issue as well as the need to stop working on 
a particular point until the military leadership had been consulted” (Weeks).  
Adoption The Council of State, an “honorific” and “high-level advisory council created to give a 
degree of legitimacy” to constitutional questions, was primarily tasked with revising 
the final draft of the 1980 Constitution (Collier and Sater; Valenzuela). The chairman, 
ex-President Alessandri, resigned from the Council after “suggestions to Pinochet… 
were deemed excessively liberal” (Collier and Sater).  
Ratification The 1980 Constitution was ratified by plebiscite on September 11th, with 68.5% of a 
total voting population of six million voting in favor of the constitution; however, the 
campaign and election were held under autocratic conditions, such that the actual 
results are less than clear (Schreiber and Zilla).  
 
Constitutional History, 1989-1998 
By 1986, the opposition decided the best strategy for effectuating democratic change was to work 
within the “institutional framework of the 1980 Constitution” (Garreton). This meant that the opposition 
prepared itself for the upcoming 1988 plebiscite alongside “reform - not reject[ion of] - the institutional 
framework” (Garreton). The eventual triumph by the united democratic opposition of the Concertación de 
Partidos “unleashed a full transition process.” Following the plebiscite, and “Pinochet’s acceptance that 
he would need to compromise to a certain degree,” the Concertación and the regime agreed to forty-five 
modifications to the constitution, including basic electoral reform and reform to the National Security 
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Council (CSN) to balance civic-military representation (Weeks). On December 14th, 1989, Concertación 
and center-left candidate Patricio Aylwin won the presidency with 94% of the vote.  
By the end of Aylwin’s presidency in 1994, his administration “accomplished few of the 
promised institutional and legal reforms,” which included the “elimination of designated senators; 
revision of the political party and electoral laws that produced overrepresentation of the political right in 
the legislature… reorganization of the [CSN]; allowing the president to name and remove armed service 
commanders; removing prohibitions on union leader participation in political parties; strengthening 
legislative authority and initiative; judicial reforms”, and more (Loveman 311). Due to the extraordinary 
majorities required in the legislature to modify constitutional clauses (ranging from two-thirds to four-
sevenths of Congress), the “political right and military” was able to impede most structural reform 
(Loveman). An important exception reduced presidential term limits after the first electoral cycle from 
eight to six year terms (Loveman), and the “return [of] the country’s 300 municipalities (still run by the 
Pinochet-appointed alcaldes) to democratic control” (Collier and Sater). However, the “bulwarks of 
protected democracy” - even Pinochet’s ongoing position as Commander in Chief of the Army - remained 
in place after four years of civilian government under Aylwin (Loveman).  
 In the 1993 presidential election, Concertación and Christian Democratic Party (CDP) candidate 
Eduardo Frei won the presidency with 58% of the vote. Frei in 1995 proposed constitutional amendments 
that would reform the CSN and replace the designated senators with elected representatives by 1998 
(Weeks). Despite some members of the Renovación Nacional (RN) working with the Concertación to win 
passage, the Senate in April 1996 voted the proposals down. Likewise, another set of proposals in January 
1997 to integrate the separate intelligence apparatus of the individual military branches, and remove 
designated and lifetime senators failed (Weeks 117). The military’s institutional foothold in politics 
remained strong throughout Frei’s presidency, such that ‘authoritarian “enclaves” persisted well past the 
initial transition to civilian rule (Weeks 117). 
 
The Military’s Role in Politics, 1999-2005 
As previously said, Croissant and Kuehn define civilian control of the military relations within 
three separate decision-making areas, “elite recruitment and overall public policy, national defense, and 
internal security” (Croissant and Keuhn 190). As such, this standard will be applied to the presidential 
term of Ricardo Lagos (1999-2005). In addition, given the institutionalized nature of Chile’s autocracy, 
this analysis will take a legalistic approach to understanding the military’s influence in post-transition 
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politics. In July 1989, the Concertación released a “less inflammatory” program for civic-military reform, 
which included (Weeks)9:  
Policy Proposal Result in 1999 
Adding another civilian to the CSN 
and downgrading its role to an 
“advisory organ” to the president of 
the republic 
A 1989 amendment equalized civic-military representation on 
the CSN (4-4), such that even if “the military could still call a 
meeting of the CSN”, the institution “no longer functioned as a 
vehicle for the military to… overcome civilian resistance” 
(Weeks). A meeting of the CSN was only convoked by the 
military once between 1990 and 2002.  
Allowing the President to fire military 
commanders in chief 
Aylwin’s 1993 proposal was rejected by Congress (Collier and 
Sater).  
Investigating, judging, and 
prosecuting violations of human rights 
in civilian courts 
Aylwin set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission “to 
make an accounting of human rights violations during the 
Pinochet years”, which nevertheless lacked broad 
prosecutorial powers and the ability to name perpetrators 
(Collier and Sater). 
Derogating the 1978 amnesty law Although never fully repealed, in 1998 the Supreme Court 
ruled “that the law should not apply to cases of human rights 
violations” (Amnesty). This allowed more substantial 
prosecutorial efforts in the judiciary in the intervening years, 
particularly following Pinochet’s 1998 arrest (Weeks).  
Having the state reimburse victims of 
human rights abuses for any “material 
and mortal damages” 
Aylwin “introduced a compensation scheme for the victims of 
repression” (Collier and Sater).  
 
Reforming laws and constitutional 
articles related to calling states of 
exception.  
Failed, the Chilean armed forces remained the “guarantor” of 
the nation under the 1980 Constitution.  
 
9 The list featured here only includes proposals of which the level of reform success was clear.  
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Moving the national police and 
investigations to the Interior Ministry. 
Failed, Frei’s attempt to give the Ministry of the Interior 
“coordination of all ministries and organizations related to 
public security” was practically rejected by the armed forces 
and carabineros, the “primary contact point between the 
government and the national police was the Defense Ministry” 
(Weeks).  
 
Aside from the Concertación’s explicit program, reform proposals to keep the military’s influence 
frequently included: 
Policy Proposal Result in 1999 
Efforts to bring the intelligence apparatus under 
civilian government (Weeks 116) 
Failed, Frei submitted a proposal in 1995 to bring 
“all military intelligence under one [civilian] 
authority,” but military opposition quashed the 
measure (Weeks).  
Amendmending the Binomial Electoral system 
(O’Malley) 
Failed, no amendment passed. 
Removal of nominated and lifetime Senate seats 
(O’Malley) 
Failed, no amendment passed.  
 
By 1999, when the first socialist since 1973 in Ricardo Lagos won the presidency, these policy proposals 
remained unfulfilled. Aylwin and Frei both tacitly supported human rights efforts and pushed civic-
military communications into more formal channels that favored the civilian government, but the lack of 
successful amendment processes meant any congressional measure was dependent on support from the 
military and/or right-oriented parties like the RN and Unión Demócratica Independiente (UDI). The 
military thus retained “considerable [institutional] autonomy,” even as the military has been led to accept 
“public opinion as something to be won” (Weeks). Thus, under the 1980 Constitution and ensuing 
amendments, the armed forces still held significant political power and - had they “decide[d that the] 
institutional order [was] threatened” - the constitutional prerogative to intervene in democratic politics 
(Weeks). Nevertheless, by 2005, the Lagos administration in the last year of its term passed significant 
constitutional reform. This earned the updated constitution the title of “Lagos Constitution” to signify the 
difference between the authoritarian pre-2005 and democratic post-2005 document (CNN Chile). These 
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58 modifications included reducing the presidential terms to four-years without re-election, removed the 
armed forces from its prior role as national ‘guarantor,’ gave the president the authority to fire 
commanders, and removed designated and lifetime senators (Mirada Politica). An important pre-2005 
amendments reformed the process of amendment making (Mirada Politica). 
 Thus, there is an important temporal distinction between the military’s role in politics at the start 
and end of Lagos’ presidential term. In 1999, the military still exerted significant control over internal 
and, given the binomial electoral system and designated-senators, elite-level personnel matters. By 2005, 
the democratic regime ended the system of unelected senators and passed amendments to grant hire and 
fire authority to the president. Likewise, between 1999 and 2005 the constitutional prerogative to act as 
‘guarantor’ of the national order was removed, thus curtailing any constitutional rationale to interfere in 
internal security concerns. The consolidation of democratic constitutionalism via Lagos’ amendments 
would not have been possible had the armed forces still exercised a veto power in constitutional 
deliberations. As such, between 1999 and 2005, Chile and the Lagos administration were able to remove 




After the military government annulled the June 12th, 1983 election results, President Babangida handed 
power to an Interim National Government (ING) composed entirely of civilians except for Minister of 
Defense Sani Abacha, the sole military member (Bourne). The election’s winner, M.K.O. Abiola, 
travelled to the UK and US to galvanize international support as major demonstrations took place in 
Lagos (Bourne; Edozie). The ING fell apart within three months following a judgment in the Lagos High 
Court declaring that Babangida had already lost his authority when he established the ING, leading 
Abacha to initiate a military coup bringing himself to power on November 17th, 1993 (Bourne; Edozie). 
Despite initial indications Abacha would fulfill the June 12th mandate, he soon consolidated power and 
arrested Abiola for treason (Edozie). His oppressive rule lasted until his surprise death on June 8th, 1998, 
after which General Abdulsalami Abubakar was sworn in as the new President (Bourne). Abubakar 
moved quickly toward civilian rule, proposing a series of elections that would eventually end with the 
inauguration of the new civilian president and ex-General Olusegun Obasanjo on 29th May. 
 
The 1999 Constitution  
As part of Babangida’s Transition-to-Democracy Program, his regime developed a 1989 constitution; 
however, the constitution only went into effect after local and legislative elections, such that the 
annulment of the 1993 presidential elections left the document only partially implemented (Ayua and 
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Dakas). Abacha at first legitimized his regime by Constitution (Modification and Suspension) Decree 
107, which suspended his 1989 constitution and disallowed the judiciary from challenging any military 
decree (Bourne). The Abacha regime then held largely boycotted elections for a new National 
Constitutional Conference (NCC), which developed in 1995 a draft constitution that was nevertheless 
abandoned following his death (Ayua and Dakas; Edozie).  
“Mobilization 
of Interests” 
General Abubakar appointed a Constitution Debate Coordinating Committee 
(CDCC) tasked with “organiz[ing] nationwide consultations on a new constitution 
and to make a report and recommendations” (Ayua and Dakas 247). The CDCC 
found significant animosity against the 1995 draft and 1989 constitution, such that 
the 1979 constitution was used as a starting point (Ayua and Dakas). Abubakar and 
the CDCC ignored significant calls from civil society to establish a Sovereign 
National Conference (SNC) for the establishment of a new constitution (Eisenstadt 
et al).  
Drafting Besides the Chairman, Judge Niki Tobi, the 23 other members were “handpicked by 
the military regime” (Akinrinade 48; IPS). The CDCC, furthermore, only had a 
mandate of two months, significantly limiting its ability to publicly consult and then 
organize around reform (Akinrinade). In the end, the CDCC advocated using the 
1979 constitution as the starting point for a new constitution. Although written under 
the “watchful eye of an outgoing military regime,” the 1979 constitution followed a 
process of public consultation that gave significant political leverage to reformers 
(Eisenstadt et al 108). Even then, the military government at the time made more 
than 17 amendments to the Constituent Assembly’s draft before promulgation and 
date of effect (Ayua and Dakas). The CDCC also amended the 1979 constitution to 
include “relevant amendments from the 1995 Draft Constitution” (Tobi).  
Consultation The CDCC was tasked solely with “[piloting] the debate, co-ordinate and collate 
views and recommendations canvassed by individuals and groups” in regard to the 
1995 constitution (Ihonvbere; Tobi). In addition to public debates and forums, the 
CDCC received a total of “405 memoranda from Nigerians within and outside the 
country” (Tobi). The committee “never tried” to engage with the well-organized 
democratic opposition, including the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and 
the Campaign for Democracy (CD) (Ihonvbere 350). Although more transparent 
than previously-imposed Nigerian constitutions, the limit to the CDCCs mandate of 
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two months meant that public consultation was inherently limited to the 1995 draft 
and not wider constitutional debate.  
Adoption Judge Tobi presented the results of the CDCC’s work to the Provisional Ruling 
Council (PRC) for adoption on December 30th, 1998. The PRC rejected 
constitutional provisions supported by Abubabakar to “limit the president to one 
term and rotate the office around six geopolitical zones” of the country” (Eisenstadt 
et al 107). The PRC spent three days following the draft’s presentation to put 
“finishing touches” on the final document (Akinrinade 50).  
Ratification Abubakar and the PRC promulgated the new constitution by Decree No 24 on May 
5th, 1999, and went into effect on May 29th, 1999 (Ihonvbere). The draft was “never 
published or discussed by the public” prior to ratification or presidential election 
(Ihonvbere 346, 350).  
 
Constitutional History, 1999-2007 
The “perceived procedural illegitimacy and centralizing structures” of the 1999 constitution provided the 
foundation for ongoing public debate and support for an SNC or, at minimum, extensive amendments. 
The National Assembly in September announced a review of the constitution that, nevertheless, did not 
culminate in either (HRW; Akinrinade). President Obasanjo did not advocate for new constitutional 
amendments or processes and none coincided with his first administration.  
 During his second term (2003-2007) Obasanjo took part in a revision process to the constitution 
to allow himself to run for a third term (Bourne). While publicly demurring as to his motives, his 
supporters pushed Amendment Bill 2006 incredibly hard, including via “bribery and blackmail”, for 
passage (New York Times). Nevertheless, the Senate rejected the proposed amendment on May 18, 2006, 
and President Obasanjo subsequently declared acceptance of the outcome (Bourne). The rest of his 
presidential term did not seriously consider other new constitutional amendments.  
 
The Military’s Role in Politics, 2007-2011 
As previously said, Croissant and Kuehn define civilian control of the military relations within three 
separate decision-making areas, “elite recruitment and overall public policy, national defense, and internal 
security” (Croissant and Keuhn 190). This standard will be applied to the third presidential term of the 
Fourth Republic (2007-2011), including President Umar Musa Yar’Adua and President Goodluck 
Johnathan - the latter ascending after the former’s death to illness. 
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 Elite recruitment and retention in Nigeria by 2007 looked partially different in both military and 
civilian circles than pre-transition. By 2007, the Yoruba (West) almost met Hausa-Fulani (North) 
representation in core political executive positions (Kifordu). Although this challenged the traditional 
dominance of the Northern elite in politics, this may reflect both the military’s re-introduction of southern 
Yoruba Obasanjo as a ‘concession’ during the transition and Nigeria’s historical relationship between the 
“chief-executive’s ethno-regional origin and cabinet membership” (Kifordu); this concession, notably, has 
excluded ethnic minorities’ from federal political power. In addition, Obasanjo’s core executive team was 
composed by 14.5% military-trained leaders (including himself), indicating an ongoing attachment to 
“military interests and habits like the use of force” (Kifordu 444). This continued through Goodluck 
Johnathan’s term, when he used presidential appointments to cultivate military support (Bourne). The 
aforementioned ‘concession’ had been institutionalized into the platform of the then-ruling People’s 
Democratic Party to rotate the presidency between southern and northern candidates every eight years. 
Although this informal norm creates flashpoints of ethnic contestation around elections, it has also limited 
military intervention in politics by a) minimizing the stakes of each election, and b) threatening to 
factionalize the military into a series of coups and counter-coups, given its current internal divisions 
(Ehwarieme). The military’s traditional Northern character adapted following the transition, where the 
“sweeping retirements and reorganizations have been a continuous exercise;” this additionally coincided 
with promotions and additional training opportunities being more widely distributed (Ehwarieme 504; 
Nwagwu); furthermore, the military’s self-identity as a modernizing, unifying force in Nigerian society 
was badly tarnished by decades of corruption, incompetence, and oppression (Ehwarieme).  
 In addition to its national security prerogatives, the military still has the constitutional role of 
“suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order” conditioned by the 
President’s signature and Acts of the National Assembly, which thus allows the military a certain role in 
internal security affairs (Bappah). Furthermore, the 1999 constitution declares that “nothing in the 
Constitution shall invalidate” certain laws like the National Securities Agency Act, which served to 
institutionalize much of the pre-transition national security structure (HRW). The post-transition 
government rebuilt the police force with “management and oversight” existing at the federal level with an 
eye toward minimizing the military’s internal security responsibilities”; unfortunately, a pattern of 
“ineffectiveness and human rights” abuses and a “militaristic approach to security challenges” hampered 
its security capacity (Matfess). Nevertheless, the military has since 2007 been used to suppress ethnic 
southern minorities’ desires for devolution/independence and in the war against Boko Haram in the North 
(Bappah; Luqman). The insurgency and state-response to the latter crisis has led to more than 50,000 
deaths since 2009 (Matfess). 
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 Eight years into Nigeria’s democratic transition, Nigeria’s military was partially removed from 
the political sphere. The new constitution and changes in elite personnel practices reduced the internal 
cohesion of the military and made the institution largely subservient to the civilian president; at the same 
time, the military continues to operate inside Nigeria in security matters, indicating that its 




Ferdinand Marcos ruled the Philippines through a mix of civilian elected rule (1965-1972), martial law 
(1972-1981), and a slightly weaker version of martial law (1981-1986) (Francia). In response to domestic 
and international pressure, Marcos declared snap elections for February 7th, 1986 (Francia; Komisar). 
The opposition, after intense internal debate, united behind the candidacy of Corazon Aquino (the widow 
of legendary anti-Marcos politician, Ninoy Aquino) (Komisar, 60-77). On election day both Marcos and 
Aquino claimed victory, following “numerous instances of fraud by KBL, the ruling party” (Francia, 
259). After a failed coup by a faction in the military, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), 
Marcos moved to arrest leaders Juan Enrile and Fidel Ramos on February 22nd (Francia). In the 
following three days, millions of Filipinos “from all walks of life formed a human shield around the” 
RAM leaders’ places of hiding (Francia 260), representing a broad coalition of anti-Marcos interests in 
parts of the military, the catholic church, and the moderate and leftist opposition (Francia). On February 
25th, Aquino and Marcos each were sworn in as president, but the latter was forced to leave the country 
that night; Cory Aquino was the new, democratically elected president of the Philippines (Francia). The 
first Aquino Cabinet was “an unstable coalition between anti-Marcos civilians and military rebels” 
(Thompson 164). The RAM, who instigated a failed coup with a desire for political power in addition to 
defending military prerogatives, were nevertheless well-represented, with Enrile and Ramos promoted to 
Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, respectively (Thompson).  
 
The 1987 Constitution  
On March 25th, 1986, Aquino - having declared a “revolutionary government...on the basis of clear 
sovereign will of the people” via the 1986 election and subsequent People Power movement - announced 
an interim Freedom Constitution that provided the president with both legislative and administrative 
power (Rodriguez 48-9; Keesing). The interim constitution was described as “civilian in character, 
revolutionary in origin, democratic in essence, and transitory in nature” (Keesing 29). The transitional 
period coincided with Aquino removing pro-Marcos factions from the judiciary, bureaucracy, and elected 




of Interests”10   
The decision to void the 1972 Marcos constitution was not unanimous within the 
Cabinet. Vice President Salvador Laurel urged Aquino to adhere to the old 
constitution, which would keep the legislature - and his institutional base of support - 
in place; Enrile also preferred to negotiate the transition within the old constitution, 
since he thought he could convert the majority, Marcos-aligned KBL party into a 
political base (Thompson). Aquino decided instead to replace the previous, autocratic 
constitution, which when announced included a promise to appoint a commission 
within sixty days to draft a new constitution (Rodriguez).  
Drafting Aquino appointed the 48 commissioners to the Constitutional Commission (Concom): 
while Concom was representative in that “members from the major geographical areas 
and… social groups [such] as the peasantry, labor, women, and the Muslim minority, 
they were also an “highly elite assemblage, including thirty lawyers, twelve 
landowners, and several business executives” (Thompson 166). Importantly, aside 
from a few supporters of the radical Left, Marcos loyalists, and Laurel allies, the vast 
majority backed Aquino (Thompson)11.  
Consultation Aquino publicly vowed not to interfere with Concom’s process, while publicly urging 
that they complete the process as quickly as possible (Keesing); however, informal 
contacts remained, such as when a tape was released of Aquino requesting that 
Concom clarify that the Philippines be kept nuclear free “consistent with the national 
interest” to appease the US. There was not a formal public consultation mechanism, 
but the process coincided with public mobilization of People Power and an ongoing 
threat of military coup (Francia).  
Adoption The Concom approved the final draft on October 12, 1986 by a vote of 45-2, 
following 133 days of work (De Leon). The 48th member, Filipino film director Lino 
Brocka, resigned before the final version was drafted, arguing that Concom “seemed 
intent on restoring the old guard” of pre-Marcos rather than “incorporating much 
needed reform” (Francia 271). In the campaign period prior to the referendum, 
 
10 Although discussion of a new constitution was discussed as early as 1984 by opposition segments, this analysis 
will start the mobilization of interest process following the February 25th democratic transition. 
11 Thompson argues that Concom’s bias is shown by its decision to extend Aquino’s term to June 1992. Aquino’s 
opponents preferred a result whereby she must submit to fresh elections within the parameters of the new 
constitution. 
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President Aquino campaigned aggressively for its approval (Komisar). 
Ratification The 1987 Constitution was ratified on a referendum on February 2nd, 1987, when 
76.29% of voters voted in favor of the draft in a referendum with a turnout of over 
87% (De Leon; Keesing). The results were proclaimed on February 7th, 1987.  
 
Constitutional History, 1986-1998 
The Aquino administration did not complete any amendment processes between 1987 and 1992. Fidel 
Ramos, who Aquino picked as her chosen successor, won the May 11, 1992 election (Francia). In 1996, 
with support from the business community, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and followers 
“approving of the [relative] political stability and sustained economic recovery,” Ramos supported a 
petition drive to extend presidential term limits to allow him to run a second time (Francia 295). In 
response, “powerful elements” such as the Catholic church and ex-president Aquino, who participated in 
a rally of over 200 000 people, urged Ramos to desist (Francia 295). The drive for a constitutional 
amendment faltered, and Ramos pledged to peacefully transfer power at the end of his term (Francia).   
 The new democratic system was largely undermined outside its constitutional foundations, which 
largely empowers civilian authorities in civic-military discourse (de Leon). Rather, the Philippines saw “a 
series of [seven] abortive coups, mutinies, and military revolts in the first three years of Aquino’s 
administration,” with varying levels of cooperation between pro-Marcos loyalists and RAF military 
factions (Croissant and Kuehn 196; Heiduk). The threat of military coup declined during Ramos’ 
administration, given his career as a “senior military officer,” and his co-opting of loyal officers into 
military command roles, the appointment of active and retired military officers to bureaucracies, and his 
support of their involvement in electoral politics; these officers are known as the “Ramos Boys” 
(Croissant and Kuehn; Francia).  
 
The Military’s Role in Politics, 1998-2004 
As previously said, Croissant and Kuehn define civilian control of the military relations within three 
separate decision-making areas, “elite recruitment and overall public policy, national defense, and internal 
security” (Croissant and Keuhn 190). This standard will be applied to the administration of Joseph 
Estrada, whose 2001 resignation led Vice-President Gloria Arroyo to fill the rest of his term until 2004.  
 The military played a crucial role in defining elite spaces in this period, including when high-
level military commanders advocated Estrada resign after using “public office for enrichment for himself” 
and anti-Estrada protests exploded in Metro Manila (Croissant and Keuhn; Francia 300-1). Arroyo, upon 
assuming the presidency, was forced to court the military by “plying the rank and file with subsidized 
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housing, increased benefits, and pay raises” and the appointment of generals to civilian positions, 
including five in thirty months as Chief of Staff (Croissant and Keuhn 196). The Ramos policy of 
recruiting military personnel into civilian circles “while seeming successful in the short run,” nevertheless 
politicized the officer corps further (Croissant and Keuhn 195). 
 The AFP continued to influence national defense policy, even if the constitution, previous human 
rights investigations, and congressional oversight of the military provide a solid framework for civilian 
authority (Croissant and Keuhn). Nevertheless, that democratic, institutional authority does not assert 
itself in “defense decision making and military affairs” (Croissant and Keuhn 201); instead, the military 
dominates any defense-related agency, including the Department of Defense, the National Security 
Council, and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency. Thus, any major program or reform 
proposed in Congress has been “designed by the military” which itself “[pushes] for approval” (Croissant 
and Keuhn 201).  
 The continued involvement of the AFP in internal security operations meant the military kept its 
Marcos-era role in maintaining internal security (Croissant and Keuhn). Although in 2001 parts of the 
communist movement competed in party-list elections, the transition process did not lead to political 
settlements with the New People’s Army (NPA) or the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), such that 
the military continued to justify its involvement in the use of force internally (Croissant and Keuhn; 
Rivera). This meant that the institutional division of internal and external security duties enacted by 
Aquino was de facto nullified by the 1990s (Heiduk); efforts to re-bind the military to purely external 
functions failed when the 2003 Philippine Defense Reform Program (PDRP) shifted AFP strategic 
objectives to back to internal security, amidst a renewal of Philippine-US military ties in the context of 
the Global War on Terror (Heiduk) 
 Despite extensive constitutional reform, the AFP was able to leverage itself into extensive 
representation at all levels of government, such that its core external and internal security interests 
remained largely intact and protected from civilian political authority.  
 
Discussion of Case Study Results 
The results from process-tracing and case studies point to the complexity of different transition types. In 
Chile, the initial expectations from each hypothesis conflict with each other: that is, the constitution itself 
was dominated by elites, but superficial-then-substantial amendment processes helped make the document 
in the 1990s and after more democratic. In Nigeria, in contrast, due to the lack of amendment processes to 
the AOR-developed constitution, the hypotheses would initially expect Nigerian democracy to be 
particularly vulnerable to military intervention. Lastly, in the Philippines, given a constitution was 
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developed entirely under the democratic Aquino administration, the hypotheses would expect the 
Philippines’ democracy to be consolidated regardless of amendment processes.  
The results, upon further examination, are more complicated. Chile’s military-controlled process 
created an autocratic constitution that legally institutionalized Pinochet’s and the armed forces’ rule. At 
the same time, the document created a structure for the return to civilian rule, which the opposition 
leveraged into a full-fledged transition. The document at transition perpetuated military and conservative-
aligned control in politics, but the use of amendment processes as the transition progressed and minor 
constitutional wins started accumulating, momentum increased toward more significant constitutional 
revisions that removed the military from civilian politics. Where the previous Aylwin and Frei 
administrations largely failed, the Lagos Administration at the very end of its term passed substantial 
amendment revisions impossible had the military still exercised a veto in the political process. Due to the 
cumulative effects of constitutional and non-constitutional reform, Chilean democracy by 2005 reduced 
the internal threat from the military in ways unimaginable in 1999.  
In Nigeria, the entire drafting and promulgation phase preceded the presidential election and 
transition; at the same time, the CDCC was initially authorized to revise the 1995 Abacha constitution, 
but public consultations led to them recommending the 1979 constitution with revisions from the 1995 
constitution12. Despite pressure for constitutional revision, no efforts succeeded until Goodluck 
Johnathan’s term in 2010, with passage of the first, second, and third alterations which made financially 
independent the national assembly and national electoral commission, updated electoral timelines, and 
established a National Industrial Court; Jonathan vetoed more substantial amendments that followed 
(ConstitutionNet). Even then, by 2007 changes in military and political recruitment practices left the 
former largely subservient to the latter within the political process. Thus, the military did not directly 
threaten the new democratic, constitutional order between 2007-2011.  
In the Philippines, the entire document was drafted and ratified under the interim Freedom 
Constitution, which granted Aquino absolute power in the political process. The final draft granted the 
civilian government significant authority in civil-military relations, such that there was not much effort 
toward constitutional revision. Nevertheless, between 1998 and 2004 the military enjoyed a considerable 
degree of autonomy in national security and internal security measures (which overlapped), and did a) 
incorporate itself into elite recruitment practices and b) publicly pressured for a civilian elected 
presidents’ resignation. Despite the constitutional framework in place, the military still threatened 
democratic institutions in the Philippines.  
 The conclusions from each case study are summarized below: 
 
12 To borrow Elster’s terminology, the CDCC might have been responding to “downstream” political pressure for a 
less-authoritarian constitution than the 1995 draft.   
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 IV 1: Constitutional Process IV 2: Amendment 
Process 
DV: Is Democracy the 
“Only Game in Town”? 
Chile (1989-
2003) 
Fully developed by the 
military junta and Pinochet in 
1980. 
Initial success in 1989 of 
passing constitutional 
amendments, but few 
major changes followed 




Developed by the AOR in 
1999, but with a certain degree 
of civilian influence via the 
1979 process and downstream 






Fully developed by Aquino’s 






 The results, firstly, speak to significant variation in electoral democratic consolidation. In Chile, 
the authoritarian constitution proved partially surmountable through the accumulation of amendments and 
legal reform. In Nigeria, the largely military-driven constitution, despite the lack of amendments, did not 
prevent the ensuing civilian governments from largely removing the military from democratic politics. In 
the Philippines, the civilian constitution proved ineffective in removing military factions from interfering 
in the democratic political system. This demonstrates that no type of transitional-constitutional paradigm 
or amendment reform is a necessary or sufficient condition for even electoral democracy. 
 Interestingly, the Chilean (Type IV) and Nigerian (Type II) transitions were pacted, while the 
Philippines (Type III) transition was ruptured. In part, the stability of the pacted transitions limited the 
number of attacks on the democratic constitutional order later; the Chilean military did not attempt 
another coup d’état after 1989, while only a faction of the Nigerian military failed in a 2004 coup attempt. 
In contrast, the uncontrolled Philippine transition allowed different military factions to rival the civilian 
government for authority, as evidenced by the seven attempted coups during Aquino’s administration.  
 There is a further contrast of note. In Nigeria, the informal mechanism of rotating key political 
positions between regions has supported the democratic process, while the formal constitution’s 
autocratic background and difficult amendment procedures has arguably hampered the democratic 
political process. In contrast, the Philippines formal constitution clearly supports civilian supremacy in 
civic-military relations, but informal pressure in the form of coup attempts and military officers holding 
political office has hampered democratic consolidation.  
As a whole, while the case studies are not sufficient to establish generalizable principles, the 
findings at minimum do indicate that neither autocratic control of a constitutional process nor democratic 
use of amendment procedures are necessary or sufficient conditions for the achievement of democratic 
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outcomes; moreover, the strategies and dynamics that either support or frustrate democratic transition are 
likely contextualized to the specific political environment in which the democratic transition takes places.   
 
Discussion of Findings 
The mixed-methodology study provides overlapping and distinctive results. The quantitative results 
provided support for RICP impacting democratic outcomes, where Type II transitions are more likely 
than Type I and Type III transitions to achieve electoral democracy. As such, the results do fit into the 
literature that finds support for pacted transitions providing better outcomes; however, the findings would 
provide the additional caution that, within a pacted transition, optimal outcomes proceed when the 
democratic opposition are more likely to exercise pressure on the political process later in the transitional-
constitutional paradigm. This analysis thus argues that pacts are useful for assuring a stable transition, but 
they are not universally better. Rather, pacts with greater inclusion from the democratic opposition and 
regime tend to do better than less inclusive transitional-constitutional paradigms.   
 The case studies partially confuse these results. The case studies of Nigeria and the Philippines 
largely followed the analysis: the Nigerian transitional-constitutional paradigm featured a mix of AOR 
and democratic influence, and largely succeeded in establishing an electoral democracy; the Philippines’ 
civilian government created an entirely new constitution, and factions of the military still succeeded in 
undermining civilian power in electoral politics. The Chilean case study presents two conclusions: the 
authoritarian constitution was not a permanent impediment to securing a democratic constitutional order, 
and the lack of major amendments during the first two electoral cycles did not preclude later democratic 
reform. As such, while there is qualitative evidence of the quantitative results, like much of democratic 
theory, there are always exceptions to the larger pattern. 
In regard to the second hypothesis, there is not statistically supported evidence for more or fewer 
amendment processes after the transition contributes to democratic outcomes later; this is supported by 
the case studies, which found little relationship between the number of amendments and democratic 
outcomes later. Chile and Nigeria failed to revise their constitutions significantly and still partially 
assured electoral institutions, while the Philippines’ problems in civil-military relations did not rest 
explicitly on problems stemming from the 1987 constitution. As such, at this point, not much can be said 
for the overall usage of amendments in democratic transitions.  
In conclusion, there is evidence that a medium-level of RICP influence in the transitional-
constitutional paradigm is better for democratic outcomes later. At the same time, there is significant 
variation between countries within each transition type, such that constitutional reform is not a necessary 




Following the third wave of democratic transitions, many countries adopted new democratic constitutions 
and/or amendment procedures to improve the current constitution; the defining motive for engaging in 
this often arduous process is to, in some way, reestablish the constitutional order on the basis of perceived 
political interests on the part of participating actors. The process that underlies constitutional reform, 
furthermore, likely structures the content of the particular constitution or amendment. In this context, the 
actor that most readily controls the process, whether that be the autocratic regime or the democratic 
opposition, will be the most likely to see its interests represented in the final, formal document.  
 This paper has systematically analyzed whether this ‘control’ over the constitutional process itself 
hinders or supports democratic consolidation following the transition. The primary finding is that Type II 
transitional-constitutional paradigms are most likely to achieve higher levels of electoral democracy, with 
Type I and Type II transitions achieving less. The same pattern correlates with liberal measures of 
democracy, but that hypothesis was not statistically supported. In particular, this paper joins with 
democratic theory’s general preference for pacted transitions, but underscores that that pact performs 
better in outcomes with the more influence from democratic opposition and/or then regime. At the same 
time, this paper cautions that Type II transitions do not always improve democratic outcomes. There are 
exceptions to the mean within Type II transitions, as there are exceptions to the relative loss in democratic 
scores in transitional-constitutional paradigms that overlap entirely with the AOR or post-transition 
regime. The combination of a quantitative, cross-national study of constitutional-transitional reform 
processes and the comparison of case studies demonstrate the variety of type and outcome in each 
democratic transition.  
 This paper thus contributes to the debate in democratic theory in regard to the transitional 
paradigm, offers a theoretical typology for its study, and presents an initial empirical analysis of the 
typology on democratic outcomes. Nevertheless, this paper certainly suggests further areas of exploration. 
In democratic theory, further research is required into what makes Type II transitions more successful 
than its counterparts, in addition to what leads to variation within each type of transitional-constitutional 
paradigm. In regard to the second hypothesis, more theoretical work should be done to distinguish Type 
IV and Type V transitions, as well as to understand how amendment procedures are used in each. 
Furthermore, these measures for authoritarian influence can be further applied to the ongoing work in 
constitutional theory of connecting the constitutional process to constitutional content, enforcement, and 
endurance. In general, democratic and constitutional theory should work to further differentiate and 
systematize variations in democratic transitions.  
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With this, this paper will conclude on a more hopeful note: the lack of consistency in outcomes between 
transition types indicates the indeterminacy and unending nature of democratic politics after transition. 
Even as democratic outcomes favor a certain degree of AOR rule, the findings also indicate that the 
transitional-constitutional paradigm should overlap with more democratic influences and not fewer (i.e. 
political party activism, mass mobilization, protests, and more). Furthermore, as further demonstrated by 
Chile’s constitutional assembly slated for May 2021, residual authoritarianism is not a pre-determined 
feature of post-transition politics. At each stage in the transitional and post-transitional process, the people 
and their elected leaders can play an active role in supporting and improving democratic institutions 
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Appendix A: Dataset of Transitional Constitutional Paradigms 
While included in the works cited, the data set is additionally referenced here: 
 
Hotchner, Benjamin M. "Dataset of Transitional-Constitutional Paradigms."  
     Benjamin M Hotchner, 2nd ed., version 3, 30 Apr. 2021, docs.google.com/  
     spreadsheets/d/1wRBggu9wEAjv_Ic-Rmv1aik8W2drXT6vV_GkiVRzaVg/edit?usp=sharing. 
 
The Codebook defines all the variables and data kept within the index. The Logit tab displays the 
dependent variables as a binary, while the Polr tab displays the dependent variables in an ordinal range 
between 0 and 1.  
 
Appendix B: RICP Calculations 
The dates of transition (Dem_Date) were coded from NELDA2 (Were these the first multiparty elections? 
1,0) with additional qualitative research where needed; the existence of a constitutional process (0, 1) 
began with HeinOnline and Constitute.org’s list of constitutions, which was further contextualized into 
start and end dates (ratification, promulgation, and effect) through a mix of primary and secondary 
sources. Beg_Tran refers to the difference in days between the beginning of the constitutional process and 
the transition date; in contrast, Tran_End refers to the difference in time between the Transition and the 
end of the constitutional process. For the RICP Types (Type I, Type II, and Type III), the specific 
calculations used were: 
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Type Formula Explanation 
1 [𝐵𝑒𝑔 − 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛]
([𝐵𝑒𝑔 − 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛] − [𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛 − 𝐸𝑛𝑑])
 
The ratio of time that the constitutional process took to the 
amount of time from the beginning of the constitutional 
process from transition.  
2 [𝐵𝑒𝑔 − 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛]
([𝐵𝑒𝑔 − 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛] + [𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛 − 𝐸𝑛𝑑])
 
The ratio of time that the constitutional process took place 
under the AOR to the length of time of the entire 




) + 1 The ratio of time that the constitutional process took to the 
amount of time from the transition to the average end of the 
constitutional process. The addition of one is to make, for 
example, a constitutional process that starts on the day of 
transition will be a 0 and not a -1.  
 
The series of calculations are presented here.  
Country Type Date_Dem Start_Cons AVG_End Beg/Tran Tran/End RICP 
Albania 3 3/31/1991 11/3/1997 11/25/1998 2,409 -2796.0 -6.22 
Bangladesh_1 1 7/30/1973 3/23/1972 11/10/1972 -494 262.0 2.13 
Belarus 1 6/23/1994 7/20/1990 3/15/1994 -1,434 100.0 1.07 
Benin 1 3/10/1991 12/8/1989 10/12/1990 -457 149.0 1.48 
Brazil 2 12/17/1989 2/1/1987 10/5/1998 -1,050 -3214.0 0.75 
Bulgaria 2 6/10/1990 6/1/1990 7/12/1991 -9 -397.3 0.98 
Burkina Faso 3 5/14/1978 10/31/1987 3/7/1998 3,457 -7237.0 -0.91 
Burundi 1 07/04/2005 8/15/2004 3/9/2005 -323 117.0 1.57 
Cape Verde 2 1/13/1991 9/15/1990 11/4/1992 -120 -661.0 0.15 
CAR_1 1 3/15/1981 9/21/1979 2/1/1981 -541 42.0 1.08 
CAR_2 3 9/19/1993 9/19/1993 1/5/1995 0 -473.5 0.00 
Czech Republic 3 06/08/1990 6/6/1992 12/26/1992 729 -932.7 -3.58 
DR_2 1 5/16/1996 5/18/1992 8/14/1994 -1,459 641.0 1.78 
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Ecuador_1 1 4/29/1979 12/7/1976 11/1/1978 -873 178.5 1.26 
Ecuador_2 3 10/20/2002 9/30/2007 10/20/2008 1,806 -2192.0 -4.68 
El Salvador 1 3/25/1984 3/28/1982 12/17/1983 -728 98.5 1.16 
Estonia 1 9/20/1992 9/3/1991 6/28/1992 -383 84 1.28 
Georgia_1 3 10/11/1992 11/6/1992 9/20/1995 26 -1074.0 -0.02 
Ghana 1 12/29/1992 5/17/1991 4/28/1992 -592 245.0 1.71 
Greece 2 11/17/1974 10/3/1974 5/15/1975 -45 -179.7 0.80 
Honduras 2 11/29/1981 4/20/1980 1/15/1982 -588 -47.5 0.07 
Kenya 3 12/27/2002 12/11/2008 8/19/2010 2,176 -2792.7 -3.53 
Lesotho 1 3/27/1993 6/28/1990 3/16/1993 -1,003 11.0 1.01 
Macedonia 3 9/18/1991 9/25/1991 11/17/1991 7 -60.0 -0.13 
Madagascar 1 11/25/1992 10/31/1991 8/19/1992 -391 98.0 1.33 
Malawi 2 5/17/1994 6/13/1993 5/17/1995 -338 -365.0 0.52 
Mali 2 4/12/1992 4/5/1991 5/4/1992 -373 -22.5 0.06 
Moldova 2 2/27/1994 10/19/1993 8/27/1994 -131 -181.0 0.58 
Mongolia 3 7/29/1990 10/1/1990 12/29/1991 64 -518.7 -0.14 
Namibia 1 3/21/1990 11/1/1989 3/21/1990 -140 0.0 1.00 
Nepal 1 5/12/1991 4/9/1990 10/5/1990 -398 219.0 2.22 
Nicaragua 3 11/4/1984 4/15/1985 1/1/1987 162 -788.0 -0.26 
Niger_1 1 2/27/1993 7/29/1991 1/8/1993 -579 49.5 1.09 
Niger_2 1 10/17/1999 4/16/1999 7/29/1999 -184 80.0 1.77 
Nigeria_1 1 8/11/1979 10/18/1975 6/21/1978 -1,393 415.3 1.42 
Nigeria_2 2 2/27/1999 12/1/1998 5/17/1999 -88 -79.0 0.47 
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Pakistan_1 3 12/07/1970 4/17/1972 7/3/1973 497 -939.0 -1.12 
Paraguay 3 05/01/1989 12/01/1991 6/20/1992 944 -1146.0 -4.67 
Peru_1 1 5/18/1980 6/18/1978 11/16/1979 -700 183.7 1.36 
Philippines 2 02/07/1986 1/7/1984 11/19/1986 -762 -285.7 0.27 
Poland 2 11/25/1990 4/5/1989 5/24/1997 -599 -2372.5 0.80 
Portugal 1 6/27/1976 4/25/1975 4/2/1976 -429 86.0 1.25 
Romania 3 5/20/1990 5/20/1990 11/26/1991 0 -555.7 0.00 
Russia 2 6/12/1991 1/1/1991 11/13/1993 -162 -885.0 0.85 
Senegal 3 2/27/2000 5/19/2000 1/7/2001 82 -315.0 -0.35 
Slovakia 3 06/08/1990 6/6/1992 9/21/1992 729 -836.0 -6.81 
South Africa 2 4/26/1994 3/1/1994 8/2/1996 -56 -829.7 0.94 
Spain 2 6/15/1977 9/1/1976 9/27/1978 -287 -469.0 0.62 
Sri Lanka 3 7/21/1977 11/3/1977 8/27/1978 105 -402.5 -0.35 
Thailand_1 1 1/26/1975 12/19/1973 6/18/1974 -403 221.5 2.22 
Thailand_2 1 3/22/1992 3/15/1991 12/9/1991 -373 104.0 1.39 
Turkey 1 11/06/1983 10/28/1980 11/7/1982 -1,104 364.0 1.49 
Ukraine 3 12/01/1991 6/8/1995 6/28/1996 1,285 -1671.0 -3.33 
Zambia 1 10/31/1991 9/25/1990 8/28/1991 -401 64.0 1.19 
 
Appendix C:  Dataset Sources 
 
All Countries - Frequently Used Sources 
All Countries WTO, WHO, UN, CIA World Factbook, IndexMundi, ConstitutionNet, Keesing’s 
World News Archive, Constitute, Cheibub Elections Data, African Democracy 
Encyclopaedia Project, Political Database of the Americas. 
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Each Country - Individual Sources 
Albania Favilli, Giovanni. Report on the Mission to Tirana as a Liaison for the Venice 
Commission. Tirana, 12 Feb. 1998. Venice Commission, 
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1998)003-e. 
Argentina “Argentina (1994): Negotiating a Plural Space of Constitutional Justice.” The DNA 
of Constitutional Justice in Latin America: Politics, Governance, and 
Judicial Design, by Daniel M. Brinks and Abby Blass, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2018, pp. 135–177. Comparative 
Constitutional Law and Policy. 
Bangladesh Huq, Abul Fazl. 1973. Constitution-Making in Bangladesh. Pacific Affairs 46 
(1):59-76.  
[Blaustein, Albert P., Wayne S. Augenstein, and Lewis M. Kornhauser. 1973. 
Bangladesh. In Constitutions of the Countries of the World, edited by A. P. 
Blaustein and G. H. Flanz. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc.] 
Sen, S. C. "The Constitution of Bangladesh and a Short Constitutional History." 
Verfassung und Recht in Übersee/Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America (1974): 257-273. 
Belarus Chudakov, Michael F., and Cheryl R. Fackler Hug. "The Constitutional Process in 
the Republic of Belarus (1990-1994); Preliminary Results." Touro Int'l L. 
Rev. 6 (1995): 153. 
Benin Matthews, Jessie L. 1990. Republic of Benin. In Constitutions of the Countries of 
the World, edited by A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz. Dobbs Ferry, NY: 
Oceana Publications, Inc. 
Santiso, Carlos. 1998. Case Study: National Conferences in Francophone Africa. In 
Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, edited by P. 
Harris and B. Reilly. Stockholm: International IDEA 
Bolivia Van Schaick, Alex. "Bolivia’s new constitution." North American Congress on 
Latin America. 2009. 
Vaca, Mery. "Bolivia Promulga Nueva Constitución" ["Bolivia Promulgates a New 
Constitution"]. BBC Mundo, BBC, 7 Feb. 2009, 
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7877000/7877041.stm. 
Brazil Comparato, Fabio Konder. 1990. The Economic Order in the Brazilian Constitution 
of 1988. The American Journal of Comparative Law 38 (4):753-771. 
Reich, Gary M. 1998. The 1988 Constitution a Decade Later: Ugly Compromises 
Reconsidered. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 40 (4):5-
24. 
Bulgaria Ganev, Venelin I. 2004. History, Politics, and the Constitution: Ethnic Conflict and 
Constitutional Adjudication in Postcommunist Bulgaria. Slavic Review 63 
(1):66-89. 
Bertschi, C. C. "Lustration and the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of Poland 





Burkina Faso Salacuse, Jeswald W., Mark P. Tarantino, Susan P. Cohen, Marianne Ferris, and 
Donna E. Correll. 1992. Burkina Faso. In Constitutions of the Countries of 
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Appendix D: Code in R-Studio 
 
All the code used in R-Studio is found here:  
R-Note Title 
1_Data Hypothesis 1: Data Upload 
2_DS Hypothesis 1: Descriptive Statistics 
3_BIBS Hypothesis 1: Bivariate Analysis and Statistics 
4_OLS Hypothesis 1: Regression 
21_Data Hypothesis 2: Data Upload 
22_DS Hypothesis 2: Descriptive Statistics 
23_BIBS Hypothesis 2: Bivariate Analysis and Statistics 
24_OLS Hypothesis 2: Regression 
 
Appendix E: Notes for Decisions in R 
 
There are two specific points of note in the code: 
1. The analysis excluded RICP values that were less than -2 or more than 2, as the 
constitutions are less tied to the transitional process than constitutions developed within 
the aforementioned range.  
2. There is not good data on Natural Resource rent rates in Taiwan; as such, given 
qualitative sources that say those rates are low, I chose to set Taiwan Natural Resource 
rents as the first quartile (CIA World Factbook).  
 
 
